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1.  Introduction  
In this paper we analyze the effects on consumption patterns and tax revenue of changes in indirect 
taxes for Norway. In particular we are interested in the following question. Is there, for certain goods, 
a tax revenue maximizing tax rate, such that the tax revenue increases monotonically with the tax rate, 
reaches a maximum, and declines thereafter monotonically with the tax rate? This type of relationship 
between tax revenue and tax rate generates what we call Dupuit curves, after the French economist 
who described this relationship in 1844 (see Dupuit, 1844). Within our context we define Dupuit 
curves and seek to establish their existence and maximum point both theoretically and empirically for 
indirect taxes on goods exposed to cross-border shopping. 
 
We take as point of departure for our analyses an empirically based consumer model, KONSUM, with 
a system of macro demand functions for all consumption divided into several consumer goods. The 
model is based on standard economic consumer theory and calibrated using data from various sources 
and econometric studies, all in accordance with the modeling tradition initiated by Frisch (1959) and 
Johansen (1960). Their key message was that by assuming an additive utility function, we can by 
knowing n budget shares, n Engel elasticities and one price elasticity, derive the whole matrix of n×n 
price elasticities. This tradition was continued by e.g. Amundsen (1963) and Bjerkholt and Longva 
(1980), and Aasness and Holtsmark (1993) utilize the same basic idea to develop this further by (i) 
letting the utility function be based on utility trees, where some goods are substitutes and others 
complements; (ii) using a specific form on the utility function, making it suitable for global analyses; 
(iii) letting the macro demand functions be derived be perfect aggregation of the demand functions 
over all households in Norway; iv) letting the utility function depend on the age of the households’ 
members; (v) taking into account economies of scale in household production; and (vi) calibrating the 
model based on econometric methods using latent variables, where both random and systematic 
measurement errors are taken into account.  
 
This model has since been developed further as an independent consumer model and as part of a 
general equilibrium model (MSG) at Statistics Norway. For our purpose we have incorporated the 
possibility of cross-border shopping and smuggling, along with a tax revenue model. For beer, wine 
and spirits, the consumer can choose between buying at home, abroad legally (cross-border – and tax-
free shopping) or illegally (smuggling/home produced). Food and non-alcoholic beverages can be 
bought both at home and abroad legally. This allows us to analyze the effect on consumption patterns 
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after changing indirect taxation and the ensuing effect on tax revenue. We can also analyze the effects 
on the Norwegian consumption pattern when foreign prices change.  
 
When calculating revenue effects of changes in indirect taxes, it is often not done within a 
comprehensive framework consisting of a complete demand system with numerous goods, derived 
from maximization of a specific utility function. Moreover, cross-border shopping and smuggling are 
not modelled within such a framework (cf. Walker and Huang, 2003).  Often, the only thing taken into 
account is the direct price elasticity at initial prices, without concern for cross-price effects (NOU, 
2003:17, chs. 4 and 9; Crawford and Tanner, 1995). We developed our model in fact for a government 
appointed commission charged with evaluating the effects of cross-border shopping in Norway and 
whether tax revenue computation associated with indirect taxes (excise taxes) on cross-border exposed 
goods could be improved ( NOU, 2003:17).1 
 
The theoretical literature on commodity tax competition shares some of the features of our study in the 
sense that it considers cross-border shopping and it often assumes only revenue maximization (Mintz 
and Tulkens, 1986; Kanbur and Keen; 1993, Wildasin, 1988; Lockwood, 1993, 2001; Nielsen, 2001; 
Oshawa, 1999; Wang, 1999). However, these studies use game theory to find and characterize 
different equilibria when nations engage in strategic tax setting. Christiansen (1994) is one instance of 
a study focusing on cross-border shopping that does not use game theory, but which considers welfare 
maximization. Turning to empirical studies, they often settle for finding possible reaction curves, 
without founding this explicitly on e.g. consumer theory (Rork, 2003; Nelson, 2002; Devereux et al., 
2007). In our study we find revenue maximizing tax rates conditional on the other countries’ tax 
rates/prices. We will also give examples of how the maximizing tax rates change when foreign prices 
change, cf. tables 6 and 7. This is the first step in the search for the reaction curve for Norway under 
revenue maximization.2  We differ from the empirical literature mentioned above, in grounding our 
empirical analyses explicitly on consumer theory and by focusing on changes in consumption patterns 
within a country, cf. our detailed complete demand system.  
 
In the following we will show that by allowing for cross-border shopping/tax-free shopping, and 
smuggling, the elasticities for the goods in question increase significantly. Consequently we get 
revenue maximizing tax shares for wine and spirits. The partial revenue from wine as a function of the 
tax share on wine has a single maximum value close to the actual tax rate in Norway in 1999, 
                                                     
1 One of the authors, J. Aasness, was a member of this commission.  
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conditioned on all the other exogenous variables this year. The total revenue as function of the tax 
share on wine also has a single maximum value, larger than that of the partial revenue function. These 
results are valid for spirits as well. We find no revenue maximizing tax share on the other goods 
included in the analysis.   
 
In Section 2 we go through our model’s basic theory and concepts. We introduce the empirical model 
in Section 3, and present the simulation results in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. 
2. Basic theory and concepts 
We use standard economic consumer theory, see e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), but with several 
specifications and interpretations. We take as a starting point the assumption of households 
maximizing utility subject to a linear budget constraint  
(1) uht = u(q1ht,...,qjht,...,qnht;a1h,a2h),                            j ∈ J,   h ∈ H,  
(2) p1tq1ht + ... +pjtqjht +... + pntqnht = yht,   j ∈ J,   h ∈ H, 
where u(.) is a utility function, which can be interpreted as an ordinal preference indicator; uht is the 
utility level for household h in time period (or hypothetical situation) t; H is the set of all households 
in Norway; qjht is the consumption of commodity group j for household h in time period t; J is the set 
of all commodity groups; n is the number of commodity groups in the set J; a1h and a2h are the number 
of children and adults respectively in household h; pjt is the price of commodity group j in period t; 
and yht is the total consumption expenditure for household h in time period t. By maximizing utility (1) 
subject to the constraint (2) we are able to derive Marshallian demand functions for each household, 
(3) qjht = gj(p1t, ..., pnt, yht, a1h, a2h),    j ∈ J,   h ∈ H, 
i.e., the consumption of good j is a function of all prices on all consumer goods, household total 
consumption expenditure, number of children and number of adults.3 
 
Given our particular specification of the utility function, we can add up all households’ demand and 
derive total demand functions for Norway of the type, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Elaborating on this, Nygård (2009) seeks equilibrium tax rates for spirits within a game theoretical framework with 
participation of the Scandinavian countries.  
3 By minimizing the costs (2) subject to a given utility level (1), we get Hicksian demand functions, see e.g. Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) for basic concepts and Indahl et al. (2001) for an application of this type of model. All the results below, 
such as aggregation over all consumers and the derivation of different revenue functions, can be shown in an analogous way 
by taking the Hicksian demand functions as a starting point. This enables analyses of policy changes based an empirical 
model of this type. Nevertheless, in the following analyses, we rely entirely on the Marshallian demand functions.  
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(4) Qjt = gj(p1t, ..., pnt, Yt, A1t, A2t, Nt),   j ∈ J, 
where Qjt is total private consumption of commodity group j in Norway in period t; Yt is the sum of 
total consumption expenditures over all Norwegian households; A1t, A2t, and Nt are the number of 
children, the number of adults and the number of households respectively, in Norway in period t. 
These variables are defined as simple arithmetical sums of the corresponding household variables and 
Nt is the number of elements in the set H of all the households in Norway. The fact that, under certain 
additional assumptions, the macro demand functions in (4) can be derived from the micro demand 
functions in (3), is shown for a special case in Aasness and Holtsmark (1993, theorem 2) and analyzed 
in a more general model in Aasness et al. (1996, pp. 339−341). 
 
From the budget constraints (2) for all households in Norway and the definition of the macro variables 
we can easily derive a budget constraint for the 'macro consumer': 
(5) p1tQ1t + ... + pjtQjt +... + pntQnt = Yt, 
i.e., the sum of price times quantity over all the goods is equal to the macro total consumption 
expenditure. It is also possible to show that there exists a utility function U(.) of the type 
(6) Ut = U(Q1t,...,Qjht,...,Qnht;A1t,A2t;Nt), 
such that if the 'macro consumer' maximizes the utility function (6) subject to the budget constraint (5) 
we get exactly the same system of demand functions as in (4) above by adding all the demand 
functions for all the households in Norway. 
 
Each of these theoretical properties have several advantages that could be utilized in the development 
of practical models for analyzing economic policy. In particular we get macro demand functions in (4) 
that satisfy exactly the linear budget constraint in (5) for any chosen tax system with subsequent 
effects on prices and the total expenditure. The system of macro demand functions in (4) satisfies all 
standard consumer theory properties and relations of an individual consumer, cf. e.g. Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). This gives us a large set of control opportunities, including the restrictions on the 
sum of columns and rows in Table 4 below, for instance. They could be very useful for e.g. revealing 
programming errors. By making further restrictions concerning the specification of the utility function, 
cf. the utility tree in Figure 1, the number of restrictions can grow considerably. This relationship 
between micro and macro gives us many ways to calibrate and test the model against data from 
different sources. Of particular interest would be to combine household and macro data, see Aasness 
and Holtsmark (1993) for an example. Finally, in applied analyses various economic theories such as 
welfare theory and theory of optimal taxation could be applied, see Aasness et al. (1996) and Schroyen 
and Aasness (2006) for examples. 
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In what follows, we refer to prices (pjt) facing consumers as consumer prices. They will be affected by 
excise taxes, VAT and other indirect taxes and subsidies. The relationship between the consumer price 
(pj), price without tax (p*j) and the tax rate (tj) for good j, is assumed to be 
(7) pjt = p*jt(1+tjt),      j ∈ J. 
The tax rate tjt can be interpreted as a function of all excise taxes, system of VAT, and other indirect 
taxes and subsidies associated with the consumer good, see (21) below. The tax rate is measured in 
proportion to the price of the good without taxes (p*j). We only take into account taxes that raise 
domestic tax revenue. For commodities bought abroad (cross-border – and tax-free shopping), the tax 
rate will be zero. 
 
Instead of measuring tax as share of the price without tax (p*j), it can be measured as a share of the 
consumer price (pj). We denote the latter tax share for commodity j as τj. The relationship between 
these two tax concepts is as follows,  
(8) τjt = tjt /(1+tjt),      j ∈ J. 
From this we realize that when tj goes to infinity, τj will approach 1. Table 4 presents the tax rates (tj) 
and the tax shares (τj) for the model base year. We find it useful to exploit both concepts in this paper.  
 
The tax per unit of a good is tjtp*jt, and the tax revenue from Norwegian households' total consumption 
of good j becomes 
(9) Tjt = tjtp*jtQjt,      j ∈ J. 
We will refer to this as the partial revenue from good j. We define the total tax revenue from indirect 
taxes associated with household’s total consumption of all consumer goods as 
(10) Tt = Σj∈JTjt = Σj∈J tjt p*jtQjt, 
i.e., as the sum of all partial tax revenues. 
 
From (4), (7), and (9) follows the partial revenue function (PRF) associated with each commodity 
group,  
(11) Tjt = TPRFj(t1t, ..., tnt, p*1t, ..., p*nt, Yt, A1t, A2t, Nt),  j ∈ J. 
Setting all variables constant except for the tax rate of the specific good, we can define the partial 
revenue from commodity j as a function of the tax share for the same commodity j:   
(12) Tjt = TPRCj(tjt) ≡ TPRFj(t10,...,tjt,...,tn0, p*10,...,p*n0, Y0, A10, A20, N0),  j∈J. 
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Since this function can be displayed as a one-dimensional curve, we call it the partial revenue curve 
(PRC) for commodity j.  
 
We can now formulate a hypothesis: 
 For some goods j ∈ JPRCM ⊆ J, the partial revenue curve TPRCj(tjt) will increase monotonically 
(13)      to a specific value of the tax rate (tPRCMj), called here the partial tax revenue maximizing 
tax rate for good j, after which it declines monotonically with the tax rate.   
For such goods we call the partial revenue curve a Dupuit curve, in honor of the French economist 
who described such curves already in Dupuit (1844). We could also call it a Laffer curve, since the 
American economist Arthur B. Laffer got much publicity in the 1970’s by focusing on this possible 
type of non-monotonic relationship between a tax rate and tax revenue, cf. Fullerton (1981). However, 
Laffer did not focus on specific indirect taxes, but rather tax on labor and taxes in general.  
 
Given that hypothesis (13) applies for good j, and that the partial revenue curve TPRCj(tjt) is 
differentiable, the partial tax revenue maximizing tax rate (tPRCj) is determined by the first order 
condition  
(14) ∂TPRCj(tPRCMj)/∂tjt = 0,    j ∈ JPRCM ⊆ J. 
This condition can be used to characterize or compute tPRCMj. From (4), (7), (9), (14) and formulas 
(5.5) and (5.8) in Sydsæter, Strøm and Berck (2005) it follows that  
(15) τPRCMj = -1/ejj,      j ∈ JPRCM ⊆ J, 
where ejj is the direct Cournot elasticity for commodity j, from demand function (4). Note that such 
elasticities are endogenous variables both in our theoretical and empirical model, depending on the 
partial revenue maximizing tax rate (tPRCMj) and the values of all the conditional variables in (12) 
above, i.e. (t10,...,tn0, p*10,...,p*n0, Y0, A10, A20, N0). Relation (15) says that the partial revenue is 
maximized with respect to the tax on commodity j, if the tax share for commodity j is equal to minus 
the inverse of the direct price elasticity of commodity j. This we call the inverse elasticity rule for 
revenue maximization, see e.g. Walker and Huang (2003).   
 
In Section 4 below we use simulation techniques to compute the partial revenue curves, within our 
large empirically based model described in Section 3, for each good in question. We examine whether 
hypothesis (13) holds, and if it does, we use numerical methods to find the corresponding maximum, 
given the base year values of the other variables in equation (12).  
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Note that the set of goods JPRCM with proper Dupuit curves as described in (13) can be the empty set 
(φ), the set of all goods (J) or any subset of J depending on the form of the utility function in (1), the 
total expenditure, demographic variables and the price vector in the base year. While we leave a 
thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of this problem for a later date, we give examples of 
commodities belonging to JPRCM, and commodities that do not, in our simulation analysis below.   
 
From (4), (7) and (10) follows the total tax revenue function (TRF) for indirect taxes:   
(16) Tt = TTRF(t1t,...,tnt, p*1t,...,p*nt, Yt, A1t, A2t, Nt). 
Setting all variables constant except for the tax rate on some good j, we can define the total tax 
revenue as a function of the tax share for good j:   
(17) Tt = TTRCj(tjt) ≡ TTRF(t10,...,tjt,...,tn0, p*10, ..., p*n0, Y0, A10, A20, N0),       j∈J. 
We call TTRCj(tjt) the total tax revenue curve (TRC) for consumer good j.   
 
We can now formulate a new hypothesis: 
 For some goods j ∈ JTRCM ⊆ J, the total revenue curve TTRCj(tjt) will increase 
monotonically (18) up to a specific value of the tax rate (tTRCj), here called the total tax revenue 
maximizing  tax      
             rate for good j, after which it declines monotonically with the tax rate.  
Given that hypothesis (18) applies for good j, and that the total revenue curve TTRCj(tjt) is 
differentiable, the total tax revenue maximizing tax rate (tTRCj) is determined by the first order 
condition  
(19) ∂TTRCj(tTRCMj)/∂tjt = 0,    j ∈ JTRCM ⊆ J. 
This condition can be used to characterize or compute tTRCMj. From (4), (7), (9), (10), (17) and 
formulas (5.5), (5.7), and (5.8) in Sydsæter, Strøm and Berck (2005) it follows that  
(20) τTRCMj = -1/(ejj + Σi∈J-j eijTi/Tj)   j ∈ JTRCM ⊆ J, 
where e1j,…,enj are the Cournot elasticities w.r.t. the price of commodity j, from demand function (4), 
conditioned on the tTRCMj as well as on all the other conditional variables in (17) above. Relation (20) 
says that the total revenue is maximized with respect to tax on commodity j, if the tax share for 
commodity j is equal to minus the inverse of a composite price elasticity, i.e. the direct Cournot 
elasticity of commodity j plus a weighted average of the cross price Cournot elasticities w.r.t. price pj. 
This can be called the inverse composite elasticity rule for revenue maximization, in correspondence 
with Walker and Huang (2003).  
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Below we will use simulation techniques to compute the total revenue curves in our large empirically 
based model, for each tax share in question, and by inspection find if hypothesis (18) holds, and if so 
by numerical methods find the corresponding maximum, given the base year values of the other 
variables in equation (17).  
 
Note that the set of goods JTRCM as described in (18), can be the empty set (φ), the set of all goods (J) 
or any subset of J depending on the form of the utility function in (1), the total expenditure, 
demographic variables and the price vector in the base year. Furthermore, JTRCM can be different from 
JPRCM defined in (13) above. A thorough theoretical and empirical analysis of this problem must wait, 
but we give examples of goods belonging to JTRCM, and goods that do not, in our simulation analysis 
below, which is based on our empirical model. We also show how the total tax revenue maximizing 
tax rate for a commodity (tTRCMj) can depend systematically on other variables held constant in (17), 
cf. Figure 6 below.  
 
Note that we can define revenue functions and revenue maximizing tax shares when several taxes are 
allowed to change jointly, cf. Table 5 below for an empirical example.  
 
Let us now assume that the tax system represented by VAT, excise taxes and other tax and subsidies 
arrangements, can be described by a vector of concrete tax parameters (a1t,...,amt). Further, let us 
assume that the total tax rate associated with each good is a function of these parameters: 
(21) tj = tj(a1t,...,amt),                   j ∈ J. 
It follows from (7) and (21) that we can write the consumer prices as a function of the tax parameters 
(a1t,...,amt), 
(22) pj = p*j(1+tj(a1t,...,amt)) ≡ pj(a1t,...,amt),    j ∈ J. 
There are practical and theoretical advantages to be gained from decomposing the tax model in (7) and 
(21), instead of considering how the consumer prices pjt depend on the concrete tax parameters in (22). 
In the present version of our model we have not specified (21) and (22). We have only used the tax 
rates tj in our model base year 1999. A general equilibrium model for Norway (MSG), developed at 
Statistics Norway, was used to compute these tax rates.4 
 
                                                     
4 Thanks to Birger Strøm for providing this. 
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3. A simulation model of consumer behavior  
Our empirical based simulation model (KONSUM-G) is perfectly consistent with the general theory 
above.5 The specification of the utility functions in (1) and (6) is based on the utility tree shown in 
Figure 1. We show the complete specification with respect to the branch for Food, beverages and 
tobacco (FBTG).6 The branches for the other main groups, Communication (CO), Housing (HO) and 
Other goods and services (OGS), are also extensive and consist of several levels, though in these cases 
we confine ourselves to indicating the groups at level two. Within the main group Food, beverages 
and tobacco (FBTG) we find 18 goods at the lowest level. All together, the model consists of 55 
goods. 
Figure 1: Utility tree for KONSUM-G 
Norway
(03AH)
Beverage without Alcohol Beverage with Alcohol (BA)
Norway (04H)  Cross-Border Sh. (04A)  Smuggling (04S)
Mat (00)
Norway (00H)     Cross-Border Shopping (00A)
Tobacco (04)
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (FBTG) 
Communication 
(CO) Housing (HO)
Other Goods and Services 
(OGS)
Total Consumer 
Demand (CB)
Coffee, Tee and 
cacao  (03A)            
 Mineral Water (03B) Spirits (03C) Wine (03D) Beer (03E)
Cross-B. Sh
(03AA)
Norway
(03BH)
Cross-B. Sh.
(03BA)
Smuggling
(03CS)
Norway
(03CH)
Cross-B. Sh.
(03CA)
Smuggling
(03DS)
Norway
(03DH)
Cross-B. Sh.
(03DA)
Norway
(03EH)
Cross-B. Sh.
(03EA)
Smuggling
(03ES)
Tourisme Abroad (66)
 
 
At each node of the utility tree a translated CES subutility function is specified, the "minimum 
quantities" of which are linear functions of the number of children and adults in the household. The 
calibration procedure exploits data from various sources and econometric studies. In particular models 
with latent variables are being used to take care of random and systematic measurement errors in data, 
cf. Aasness et al. (1993, 2003), Aasness et al. (1994), Aasness and Belsby (1997), Røed Larsen et al. 
(1997), Wangen and Aasness (2002), and Aasness and Røed Larsen (2003). We have used information 
                                                     
5 Earlier versions of the model are documented in Aasness and Holtsmark (1993), Wold (1998) and Indahl et al. (2001). See 
Sommervoll and Aasness (2001) for a version used for global simulations analyses with climate gas minimizing consumer 
prices. 
6 For a general discussion of utility trees, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, ch. 5). 
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given in NOU (2003:17) to make estimates on several of the budget shares and elasticities that serve 
as a basis for our calibration. 
 
Spirits is divided into three commodity groups: bought in Norway (H); bought legally abroad for use 
in Norway (A); smuggled into the country or distilled illegally in Norway (S). We proceed similarly 
for wine, beer and tobacco. Two categories of food and non-alcoholic beverages are used: bought in 
Norway (H) and bought abroad for use in Norway (A). None of the other goods or services are 
subdivided in this way, but Norwegian consumers’ consumption abroad is included as a separate 
group in another part of the utility tree (OGS).  
 
Since the model fully satisfies all restrictions known from general consumer theory, the results are 
easy to interpret and control. Assuming the utility function should satisfy the utility tree in figure 1 
produces many more restrictions. Our utility tree implies that every household can make decisions 
about the composition of expenditures by first considering changes in utility brought about by changes 
in consumption of goods within the same branch of the utility tree. If the tax on spirits in Norway 
rises, the consumer can be thought of as choosing his new composition of expenditure in the following 
way. He would first consider whether to reduce his consumption of spirits bought in Norway and 
make up for the loss by shopping abroad (03CA) and smuggling (03CS). Second he would consider 
whether to cut back on sprits altogether and buy more wine (03D) and beer (03E). Third he might 
consider whether to rearrange spending on Food (00), Beverage without alcohol (BO), Beverage with 
alcohol (BA) and Tobacco (04). He could also adjust the balance of expenditure on the four main 
groups at the top level of the utility tree. Finally the consumer will run down the utility tree checking 
whether his budget is optimally distributed between the different groups and subgroups.  
 
Theoretically, increasing the tax on spirits could affect consumption of diet milk which is a part of the 
Food group (00). But this can only happen by changing total expenditure on Food (00), i.e., using the 
same channel as any other price change outside the Food group. Consequently the cross-price 
elasticity between spirits and diet milk is close to zero, though not exactly. One could extend the 
utility tree, for instance, and create larger cross-price elasticity between ordinary milk and diet milk 
compared to the cross-price elasticity between ordinary milk and spirits. The exploitation of such 
assumptions is essential in our way of modeling. 
 
The model has 55 goods, resulting in a matrix of 55x55=3025 price elasticities. This matrix satisfies 
all of the requirements stipulated by consumer theory. Matrices of this size are difficult to use and 
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present. By assuming an equiproporsional change in all prices within a group, we can exploit Hicks 
composite commodity theorem and aggregate all the goods within a certain group, and still satisfy the 
requirements of consumer theory. Tables 1 and 2 present a complete set of elasticities for a grouping 
of 6 goods and tables 3 and 4 the corresponding elasticities for a grouping of 15 goods. All goods in 
the utility tree outside the branch for Food, beverages and tobacco are aggregated to form a new 
group, Other goods (AG). Within this new branch of the utility tree we have made one group, Food 
and beverages without alcohol (0BO), out of the two groups Food (00) and Beverages without alcohol 
(BO). The difference between the 6 goods group and the 15 goods group is that the latter distinguishes 
between goods bought in Norway (H); across the border (A); and smuggled or distilled at home (S), 
while these are aggregated into one common group for the different types of goods for the 6 good 
group. The elasticities for the 6 good groups are an exact aggregation of the elasticities for the 15 
goods group. In particular it is interesting to study the relationship between the elasticities for the 
aggregated and disaggregated groups.  
Table 1. Price elasticities (Cournot),  Engel elasticities (E) and budget shares (w) for food, 
beverages and tobacco. Main groups 
Codes 
Commodity 
group w (%) E ej.0BO ej.03C ej.03D ej.03E ej.04 ej.AG Sum
0BO 
Food/non-
alcoholic beve-
rages 14.595 0.306 -0.188 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.110 0.000
03C Spirits 1.386 1.324 -0.157 -0.885 0.130 0.095 -0.033 -0.474 0.000
03D Wine 0.919 1.856 -0.220 0.188 -1.247 0.133 -0.047 -0.664 0.000
03E Beer 1.164 1.139 -0.135 0.115 0.112 -0.795 -0.029 -0.407 0.000
4 Tobacco 3.087 0.303 -0.036 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.157 -0.108 0.000
AG Other goods 78.849 1.138 -0.142 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.030 -0.953 0.000
  Sum (weighted) 100.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Table 2. Price elasticities (Slutsky) for food, beverages and tobacco. Main groups 
Codes Commodity group sj.0BO sj.03C sj.03D sj.03E sj.04 ej.AG Sum
0BO 
Food/non-alcoholic 
beverages -0.143 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.132 0.000
03C Spirits 0.037 -0.867 0.142 0.110 0.008 0.570 0.000
03D Wine 0.051 0.214 -1.230 0.154 0.011 0.800 0.000
03E Beer 0.031 0.131 0.122 -0.782 0.007 0.490 0.000
4 Tobacco 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.148 0.131 0.000
AG Other goods 0.024 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.005 -0.056 0.000
  Sum (weighted) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
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Note that the column sums in tables 1−4 are zero. They are weighted sums of the elasticities which 
follow from the consumer’s budget constraint. Similarly, the row sums are all zero as a consequence 
of the demand functions being homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure. Note also 
that the cross-price elasticities are all positive in tables 2 and 4. They are Slutsky elasticities, i.e., we 
imagine the consumer receiving income compensation such that the utility level stays the same after a 
price increase. Since the consumer goods are all substitutes, every Slutsky cross-price elasticity will be 
positive. In tables 1 and 3 we have Cournot elasticities, i.e., the consumer receives no income 
compensation and several of the cross-price elasticities become negative due to negative income 
effects. Nevertheless, some goods are sufficiently strong substitutes to make the substitution effect 
dominate and the cross-price elasticities end up as positive. In particular we can observe that we get 
positive Cournot elasticities between every beverage with alcohol both in tables 1 and 3. We also get 
positive Cournot elasticities in Table 3 between goods of the same type, but depending on whether 
they are bought at home (H), abroad (A) or smuggled or produced illegally at home (S). 
 
Let us first consider the price elasticities for tobacco. From table 1 we see that the direct price 
elasticity for the main group tobacco is – 0.16. Compared with results produced by econometric 
studies, in absolute value terms, this is rather low. On the other hand, if we observe the direct price 
elasticity for tobacco bought in Norway, it is – 0.48, i.e., between 0.4–0.5 in absolute value, an interval 
considered reasonable by the commission set up by the government to report on cross-border trade 
(NOU 2003:17). And as Table 3 shows, the price elasticity for tobacco bought outside the country is   
–1.11. The fact that this elasticity is much larger in absolute value makes sense since it has a smaller 
share of total tobacco consumption than tobacco bought in Norway, as the first column of Table 3 
shows. The cross-price elasticities between the different tobacco groups are clearly positive, which is 
in line with the utility tree in Figure 1.  
 
The direct cross-price elasticities for spirits, wine and beer are – 0.9, –1.3 and – 0.8, respectively. This is 
largely in line with the considerations of the commission, but the price elasticities for spirits are 
somewhat lower. From Table 3 we see that the corresponding elasticities for spirits, wine and beer 
bought in Norway are –1.4, –1.6 and – 0.8, respectively. They have all increased in absolute value, but 
only slightly for beer, some for wine, and more for spirits. This is because a large share of the total 
consumption of spirits derives from cross-border shopping/tax-free purchases, and smuggling/illegal 
distilling, as the budget shares in Table 3 show. These price elasticities are therefore somewhat higher 
than what the commission considers to be reasonable, although they refer to price and income elasticities 
when measuring consumption in pure alcohol, while the price elasticities in tables 1−4 are based on 
17 
consumption in 1999 prices. The latter will probably be higher because decreasing prices or increasing 
total expenditure tends to favor the more expensive wine and spirits brands (Aasness (1990), Essay 2). 
The logic in our model requires that we measure the consumption of different commodity groups in 
Norwegian kroner, but we could in a consistent way add some relations for the consumption measured in 
different ways, e.g., as the amount of pure alcohol. Nevertheless, in the present model this is not done. 
 
The mechanism of the model could be partly illustrated by increasing the excise tax on spirits in 
Norway, affecting the tax share for spirits. These are some of the effects : i) the tax revenue from 
spirits will increase for a given level of demand for spirits; ii) the tax revenue will decrease because of 
falling demand caused by the higher tax rate and retail price; iii) in particular it generates a tax leakage 
consisting of revenue from excise taxes and value added tax caused by increased cross-border and tax-
free shopping and smuggling/illegal distilling; (iv) the increase in tax on spirits causes a substitution 
from spirits to wine and beer bought in Norway which increases the tax revenue; (v) the increase in tax 
on spirits causes demand to fall for other goods bought in Norway because the real value of the total 
expenditure decreases as the price on spirits increases. This decreases the total tax revenue. All of 
these effects affect the outcome simultaneously, and our model gives us the sum of the effects. It will, 
of course, depend on the properties of the model and assumptions regarding crucial quantities entering 
our model. Which of the effects that dominates will change when the tax on spirits changes, and in a 
systematic way, as shown in the forthcoming figures. 
4. Simulation results 
Effects on revenue of changes in taxes on alcohol 
Figure 2 shows how the revenue from tax on wine increases when the tax share increases until it 
reaches a maximum, after which the partial tax revenue decreases when the tax share increases. The 
same applies to spirits. The partial tax revenue maximizing tax share (as the share of consumer price, 
including VAT) is smallest for wine (0.648) and largest for spirits (0.730). This is caused by the higher 
price elasticity for wine, cf. the inverse elasticity rule in (15) and the direct price elasticity for wine 
bought at home in Table 3 (e03DH.03DH = –1.545).  
 
Strictly speaking, our simulations refer to the year 1999, the base year for our model, but similar 
qualitative results are likely to apply for other years as well. The actual tax shares for 1999 are also 
depicted in the figure. The actual tax share in 1999 for wine (0.648) is approximately equal to the tax 
share value maximizing the partial tax revenue for wine. For spirits the actual tax share (0.770) is 
larger than the tax share maximizing the partial revenue from spirits. 
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Figure 2. Partial tax revenue from spirits, wine and beer as a function of their respective tax 
share. A vertical line indicates maximum tax revenue. A cross indicates tax share in 
1999 
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Source: Statistics Norway, KONSUM-G-march-2003 
Figure 3. Total tax revenue from indirect taxes as a function of tax share for spirits, wine and 
beer respectively.  A vertical line indicates maximum total indirect tax revenue. A 
cross indicates tax share in 1999 
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From Figure 2 we observe that the partial tax revenue from beer increases monotonically with the tax 
share. In the case of beer we are not able to find any maximizing value for the partial tax revenue. This 
is caused by the fact that the price elasticity for beer is much lower than the price elasticity for wine 
and spirits, cf. Table 3. Higher rates of cross-border shopping in the future and higher price elasticity 
for beer could entail a maximum also for the partial tax revenue curve for beer. The slope of the partial 
tax revenue curve for beer is rather steep, possibly because we measure the tax as the share of the 
consumer price. Increasing the tax measured as share of the consumer price from 0.6 to 0.85 in Figure 
2 is equivalent to increasing the tax measured as ratio of the price without tax from 1.5 to 5.67 (i.e., 
from 150% to 567%), cf. (8).  
 
The results in Figure 2 just contain the partial tax revenue from the tax share we change. For the fiscal 
policy the total tax revenue is more relevant. Figure 3 shows the total tax revenue as a function of the 
tax shares for the different commodity groups. The total tax revenue curves for wine and spirits have a 
single maximum. These maximum points are located to the right of the corresponding points for the 
partial tax revenue curves. This is due to the fact that when the tax on wine increases, the demand for 
spirits and beers, which also have high tax shares, increases. See the inverse composite elasticity rule 
in (20) and the (cross-)price elasticities in Table 3. The same reasoning applies to spirits. If the tax 
share grows sufficiently, the increased tax leakage associated with cross-border shopping and 
smuggling causes the total tax revenue to decline when the tax shares increase. The total tax revenue 
maximizing tax shares (including VAT) are smallest for wine (0.733) and largest for spirits (0.785). 
The actual tax share in 1999 for wine (0.648) is considerably lower than the total tax revenue 
maximizing tax share (0.733). The actual tax share for spirits in 1999 (0.770) is also lower than the 
total tax revenue maximizing tax share (0.785), according to our model. 
 
The tax revenue curves in figures 2 and 3 show how the tax revenue changes after changing one tax 
share at a time, keeping all other variables constant. We can also compute how these tax revenue 
curves change in response to shifts in other exogenous variables in the model. We could, for instance, 
explore how changing tax shares for other commodities would affect the tax revenue maximizing tax 
shares. 
 
Table 5 shows total tax revenue from different combinations of tax shares for spirits and wine. Each 
row and column in the table can be interpreted as a total tax revenue curve for wine and spirits, 
respectively. This allows us to interpret the table as giving us different total tax revenue curves for 
each commodity depending on the tax share value of the other commodity. 
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Table 5. Total revenue from indirect taxes as a function of tax shares for spirits and wine. 
Measured in mill. 1999 kroner 
0.85 86742.84 86764.09 86783.40 86800.65 86815.74 86828.55 86838.93 86846.76 86851.88 86854.14 86853.36
            
0.84 86779.16 86800.38 86819.67 86836.91 86852.01 86864.83 86875.24 86883.12 86888.30 86890.64 86889.96
            
0.83 86807.56 86828.73 86847.98 86865.20 86880.28 86893.10 86903.52 86911.43 86916.65 86919.05 86918.45
            
0.82 86828.97 86850.08 86869.28 86886.46 86901.51 86914.31 86924.74 86932.65 86937.90 86940.33 86939.79
            
0.81 86844.21 86865.25 86884.38 86901.51 86916.51 86929.28 86939.69 86947.59 86952.85 86955.30 86954.79
            
0.80 86853.92 86874.88 86893.94 86911.00 86925.95 86938.67 86949.04 86956.92 86962.17 86964.63 86964.13
            
0.79 86858.69 86879.55 86898.53 86915.51 86930.39 86943.06 86953.38 86961.22 86966.45 86968.89 86968.40
            
0.78 86858.99 86879.75 86898.63 86915.53 86930.33 86942.93 86953.19 86960.99 86966.17 86968.59 86968.09
            
0.77 86855.25 86875.90 86894.67 86911.48 86926.19 86938.71 86948.90 86956.64 86961.77 86964.15 86963.62
            
0.76 86847.83 86868.36 86887.02 86903.72 86918.34 86930.77 86940.88 86948.54 86953.61 86955.94 86955.37
            
0.75 86837.05 86857.45 86876.00 86892.58 86907.09 86919.42 86929.44 86937.02 86942.03 86944.30 86943.67
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 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.7 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 
Tax on wine as share of the consumer price 
 
The italicized cells in the table indicate the tax shares maximizing the total tax revenue. As we see, the 
maximizing tax share for wine (0.73) is completely independent of the tax share value for spirits. The 
maximizing tax share for spirits is also not very substantially affected by the tax share value for wine 
(from 0.78 to 0.79). 
 
When the other tax share change, total tax revenue changes substantially. Whether the shift is upward 
or downward depends on the size of the other tax share. When we increase the tax share for wine, the 
total tax revenue curve shifts upward as long as the tax share for wine remains below 0.73. 
 
There is one combination of tax shares for the two commodities where we simultaneously are at the 
maximum of each total tax revenue curve, namely 0.79 for spirits and 0.73 for wine. If we increase the 
tax share for one or both commodities beyond this the total tax revenue will decrease. 
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Effects on alcohol consumption, cross-border shopping and smuggling of changes in taxes on alcohol 
Figure 4 shows that when the tax shares for spirits increase, the consumption of spirits bought in 
Norway decreases, while it increases for spirits bought abroad and consumed in Norway. Smuggling 
increases too with an increase in the tax share. Intuitively this sounds very reasonable; however the 
quantitative effects are uncertain.   
 
Total consumption of spirits falls when the taxes on spirits bought in Norway increase, which is in line 
with all conventional knowledge. But this will only apply if the tax share is less than the tax share 
minimizing total consumption. If the tax share increases beyond this level the total consumption of 
spirits will increase according to our model. The tax share minimizing total consumption of spirits is 
0.92. This is way beyond the actual tax share in 1999 (0.77), and since then the tax share for spirits has 
fallen in Norway. The existence of this consumption minimizing tax share in our model is an 
interesting result, and deserves further study. 
Figure 4. Consumption of spirits as a function of the tax share for spirits. A cross indicates tax 
share in 1999 
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Source: Statistics Norway, KONSUM-G-march-2003 
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Figure 5. Consumption of beverages with alcohol as a function of price abroad for beverages 
with alcohol. Relative prices on alcohol are assumed constant. 1999 price is normali-
zed to 1  
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Source: Statistics Norway, KONSUM-G-march-2003 
Figure 6. Total tax revenue from indirect taxes as a function of the tax share for spirits, eva-
luated for three different price levels abroad for beverages with alcohol. A vertical 
line indicates maximum total tax revenue. A cross indicates tax share in 1999 
86200
86400
86600
86800
87000
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
Tax as share of consumer price
To
ta
l t
ax
 re
ve
nu
e,
 m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 m
ill
. 1
99
9 
N
O
K
Price 1999
15% reduction in
1999 price
30% reduction in
1999 price
 
Source: Statistics Norway, KONSUM-G-march-2003 
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Figure 7. Total tax revenue from indirect taxes as a function of the tax share for wine, evalua-
ted for three different price levels abroad for beverages with alcohol. A vertical line 
indicates maximum total tax revenue. A cross indicates tax share in 1999   
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Source: Statistics Norway, KONSUM-G-march-2003 
 
Effects of changes in prices on alcohol abroad 
Figure 5 shows that lowering the price of alcoholic beverages7 sold in neighboring countries increases 
the purchase of such beverages by cross-border shopping Norwegians, while lowering consumption of 
smuggled wares and sale of  alcoholic beverages in Norway. The effect of increased cross-border 
shopping will dominate and the total consumption of beverages with alcohol will increase. 
 
Figure 6 shows that the total tax revenue curve for spirits will shift sharply downward in response to 
falling prices abroad. The total revenue maximizing tax shares in Norway will also decrease if prices 
abroad decline, although the effects are not very dramatic. We see a similar result for wine in Figure 7. 
Here the maximizing tax share is largely independent of the price abroad, according to our simulation 
model. 
                                                     
7 We assume that the prices on beverages with alcohol are changed in the same proportions. Every price is normalized to 1 in 
the year 1999.  
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Other simulation results 
We shall briefly mention some other simulation results. We were unable to find a maximum value for 
either the partial or total tax revenue curve for tobacco and for food and non-alcoholic beverages, cf. 
the result for beer. This is caused by the low price elasticities for these commodity groups. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we derived the partial revenue from each indirect tax and the total revenue from all 
indirect taxes on consumer goods as functions of all commodity prices, the tax rates on each 
commodity, total expenditure and demographic variables using a complete demand system. Within 
this framework we analyzed the existence and maximum point of Dupuit curves associated with 
certain goods exposed to cross-border shopping /tax-free shopping and smuggling. 
 
We showed that allowing for substitution to cross-border/tax-free shopping, along with smuggling, 
increases the elasticities substantially for the goods in question. As a consequence we find revenue 
maximizing tax shares for wine and spirits. The partial revenue from wine as a function of the tax 
share on wine has a single maximum value close to the actual tax rate in Norway anno 1999, 
conditioned on all the other exogenous variables in 1999. The total revenue as function of the tax share 
on wine also has a single maximum value, which is larger than that for the partial revenue. This 
emphasizes the importance of including the cross-price effects in computations of changes in tax 
revenue resulting from changes in tax share. The partial revenue from spirits as a function of the tax 
share for spirits also has a single maximum, though it is lower than the actual tax rate in 1999. On the 
other hand, the total revenue as a function of the tax share on spirits has a single maximum that is 
higher than the actual 1999 tax rate. 
 
No such maximum exists in the case of beer, nor Food/non-alcoholic beverages and tobacco as the 
elasticity on these goods is too small. 
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